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Abstract. Many inferences made in everyday life are only valid in
the absence of explicit counter information. This has led to the de-
velopment of nonmonotonic logics. The kind of reasoning performed
by these logics can be difficult to explain to the average end-user of a
knowledge based system that implements them. Although the system
can still give advice, it is hard for the user to assess the rationale be-
hind this advice. In this paper we propose an argumentation approach
that enables the advice to be assessed through an interactive dialogue
with the system much like the discussion one might have with a col-
league. The aim of thie dialogue is for the system to convince the
user that the advice is well-founded.
1 NONMONOTONIC REASONING
Human-style common sense reasoning is inherently nonmonotonic.
When new information becomes available, some of our previous be-
liefs and inferences might no longer be warranted. An often cited
example of philosopher and AI researcher John Pollock is that from
the fact that an object looks red one might reasonably infer that the
object really is red. However, if one later obtains the additional in-
formation that the object was in fact illuminated by a red light, one
should block the conclusion that the object really is red (unless one
also has other reasons to believe so). This kind of reasoning contrasts
strongly with the approach taken by formalisms like classical logic.
Here, the notion of entailment is essentially monotonic, meaning that
whenever one adds new facts, one can only obtain more (possibly the
same) and never fewer conclusions.4
The need for nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) comes from the fact
that many inferences made in everyday life are defeasible. That is,
they are only valid in the absence of explicit counter information.
The need to accommodate this type of reasoning in formal logic has
led to the field of nonmonotonic logics, of which Default Logic and
Circumscription are some well-known examples.
One of the purposes of nonmonotonic logics was to be imple-
mented in knowledge-based systems, which would then be able to
assist its users in things like diagnosis and decision making. One of
the difficulties, however, was that the kind of reasoning performed
by nonmonotonic logics can be notoriously difficult to explain to the
average end-user, who has no explicit background in how these for-
malisms function. Although the resulting system could still give ad-
vice, it would be hard for the user to assess how this advice came
about, why it is indeed the right advice and whether any objections
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4 Formally, when Φ1 and Φ2 are sets of formulas in a particular logic of
which Cn stands for the consequence relation, then monotonicity means
that if Φ1 ⊆ Φ2 then Cn(Φ1) ⊆ Cn(Φ2).
that the user might have are indeed taken into account. That is, the
challenge would be for the system to justify its advice in a way that
can actually be understood by the user. The failure to address this
issue could be seen as one of the reasons why the field of nonmono-
tonic logics did not manage to come up with any widely used com-
mercial applications.5
2 ARGUMENT-BASED REASONING
A new impulse was given in the 1990s, with the development
of formalisms for argument-based reasoning (see for instance
[17, 13, 14, 19]) which culminated in the landmark paper of Dung
[6]. In this paradigm, an argument is essentially an aggregation of
reasons that, when taken together, supports a particular conclusion.
An argument can be attacked by other arguments (like the argument
“the object is red because it looks red” is attacked by the argument
“the object is illuminated by a red light, so the fact that it looks red
is not a reason for it actually being red”). The idea is that, given
the information that is available, one can construct the relevant
arguments and examine which arguments attack which other argu-
ments. The result can be visualised in a graph, in which the nodes
represent arguments and the arrows represent the attack relation.
Given such an argumentation framework (as this graph is called in
[6]) one should then determine (using a formal criterion) which of
the arguments should be accepted, rejected or abstained from having
an explicit opinion about. As an example, consider the following
hypothetical situation involving three arguments:
A: “We should give the patient aspirin, because he’s in pain.”
B: “We should not give him aspirin, because he’s diabetic and exist-
ing research indicates that providing aspirin leads to complications
for patients who are diabetic.”
C: “The research on which this claim is based has been proven to be
flawed and has been refuted by clinical evidence.”
A B C
Figure 1. Simple argumentation framework
This situation is graphically depicted in the graph in Figure 1,
5 One notable exception is Answer Set Programming (ASP). ASP, however,
is mainly aimed at providing efficient computation for problems involving
constraint satisfaction, instead of tackling the original NMR challenge of
how to reason with rules of thumb that are subject to exceptions.
where the nodes represent arguments and the arrows represent attacks
between the arguments. Here, the idea is that at least argument C
should be accepted, because it is not attacked by any other argument.
Argument B, however, should be rejected because it is attacked by
an argument (C) that is accepted. ArgumentA is the most interesting
case. Its only attacker (B) is rejected and therefore cannot be a valid
ground anymore against the acceptance of A. Since there is no other
argument attackingA,A should therefore be accepted. This is in line
with the general approach of formal argumentation: an argument is
accepted unless there are valid grounds against doing so. In this sim-
ple example it can be seen that the status of an argument depends
on the status of its attackers, which in its turn depends on the status
of their respective attackers, etc. However, in more complex graphs
(especially those containing cycles) things are not that obvious. In
that case, a formal criterion for acceptance and rejection (called an
“argumentation semantics”) is needed. An example of such a crite-
rion is that of a complete labelling [1, 3]. Here, the idea is to assign
each argument exactly one label, which can be in (indicating accep-
tance), out (indicating rejection) or undec (indicating that there are
insufficient grounds for either acceptance or rejection).
Existing results in formal argumentation theory state that each
graph (“argumentation framework”) has at least one complete la-
belling (that is, an assignment of in, out and undec that satisfies the
above three conditions). If the graph contains cycles, more than one
complete labelling can exist. Informally, the concept of a complete
labelling can be seen as a reasonable position one can take based on
the conflicting information encoded in the argumentation framework.
The popularity of argument-based inference formalisms6 can
partly be explained by the facts that:
1. these have been shown to be powerful enough to model a wide
range of existing formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning (like
Default Logic [16] and logic programming under various seman-
tics [7, 8, 18]),
2. efficient proof procedures and algorithms are available, and
3. formal argumentation can be seen as a step forward to making
formal nonmonotonic inference understandable to end-users
The traditional approach to formal argument-based inference con-
sists of a three-step process. The first step is, given a particular
knowledge base, to construct the relevant arguments and examine
how they attack each other (that is, to construct the argumentation
framework). The second step is to evaluate the resulting argumenta-
tion framework (for instance, to determine the complete labellings).
The third step is then to examine what this means at the level of con-
clusions (recall that each argument has at least one conclusion). That
is, for each complete labelling of arguments, one determines the as-
sociated complete labelling of conclusions (for instance by applying
the procedure described in [20]).
One of the things that is missing in the above process is the dialec-
tical aspect. The traditional argumentation process (as for instance
formalised in ASPIC [2, 15, 11]) aims at putting all arguments on
the table and then simply computing which of them should be ac-
cepted. However, in natural argumentation one also encounters the
concepts of dialogue and discussion. Where do these concepts fit in
when it comes to formal argumentation theory?
6 Another application of argumentation theory can be found in the field of
game theory (see [6] for details). However, in the current paper we focus
on argumentation for (nonmonotonic) inference.
3 ARGUMENTATION AS DIALOGUE
A complete labelling can be achieved by assigning a single label to
each argument. The following rules show the possible labels:
1. if the argument is labelled in (accepted) then all its attackers have
to be labelled out (rejected)
2. if the argument is labelled out (rejected) then it has at least one
attacker that is labelled in (accepted)
3. if the argument is labelled undec (abstained) then not all its at-
tackers are labelled out (so there are insufficient grounds to ac-
cept it) and it doesn’t have an attacker that is labelled in (so there
are insufficient grounds to reject it)
A dialogue game consists of the following moves:
claim This is the first move in the dialogue. The proponent claims
that a particular argument has to be labelled in. This creates a
commitment that the proponent enters into.
why The opponent asks why a particular claim holds – why a par-
ticular argument has to be labelled a particular way
because A party explains why the label of a particular argument has
to be the way it was earlier claimed to be.
concede With this move, a party concedes part of the statements
uttered earlier by the other party
A dialogue takes place under the following rules:
• The proponent (P) and the opponent (O) take turns. Each turn of
P consists of a single move: claim or because. O plays one or
more moves in a turn. O’s turn starts with an optional sequence
of concede moves and finishes (when possible) with a single why
move.
• P gets committed to arguments used in claim and because
moves; O gets committed to arguments used in concede moves.
• P starts with claim in (A) where A is the main argument of the
discussion: claim cannot be repeated later in the game.
• In consecutive turns P provides reasons for the directly preceding
why (L) move of O by moving because (L′) where L′ is a reason
of L. 7
• P can play because only if the reason given does not contain any
arguments already mentioned (i.e., in P’s commitment store) but
not yet accepted (i.e., not in O’s commitment store). We call such
arguments open issues.
• O addresses the most recent open issue L (in(A) or out(A)) in
the discussion. If O is committed to reasons for L it must concede
L otherwise O starts to question all reasons that O is not commit-
ted to with why.
• O can question with why only one argument at a time.
• The moves claim, because and concede can be played only if
new commitments do not contradict a previous one.
• The discussion terminates when no more moves are possible. If O
conceded the main argument then P wins, otherwise O wins.
Given the argumentation framework in Figure 2 the interaction be-
tween a proponent and an opponent may look as set out in Table 1.
Recent research has indicated that it is perfectly possible to use the
above-sketched dialogue as a basis for formal argumentation theory.
The idea is that an argument is accepted iff it can be defended in
rational (structured) discussion. The fully specified theory described
in [4] together with the with associated implementation [5] allows
7 A reason for {(A, in)} is {(B1, out) . . . (Bn, out)} where B1 . . . Bn are









Figure 2. An argumentation framework with more than one path. Nodes
represent arguments and arrows indicate attack relations. The dialogue in
Table 1 shows how this argumentation framework is traversed, and how the
status of argument A is determined by observing that it has to be labelled in
by every complete labelling.
Table 1. Table shows the interaction between Proponent and Opponent for
the argumentation framework in Figure 2
Commitment stores
Proponent Opponent
move in out in out
P:claim in (A) A - - -
O:why in (A) A - - -
P:because out (B,C) A B,C - -
O:why out (B) A B,C - -
P:because in (D) A,D B,C - -
O:why in (D) A,D B,C - -
P:because out (F) A,D B,C,F - -
O:why out (F) A,D B,C,F - -
P:because in (G) A,D,G B,C,F - -
O:why in (G) A,D,G B,C,F - -
P:because out (H) A,D,G B,C,F,H - -
O:why out (H) A,D,G B,C,F,H - -
P:because in (I) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H - -
O:concede in (I) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I -
O:concede out (H) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I H
O:concede in (G) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G H
O:concede out (F) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G H,F
O:concede in (D) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G,D H,F
O:concede out (B) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G,D H,F,B
O:why out (C) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G,D H,F,B
P:because in (E) A,D,G,I B,C,F,H I,G,D H,F,B
O:concede in(E) A,D,G,I,E B,C,F,H I,G,D,E H,F,B
O:concede out (C) A,D,G,I,E B,C,F,H I,G,D,E H,F,B,C
O:concede in(A) A,D,G,I,E B,C,F,H I,G,D,E,A H,F,B,C
participants to discuss whether a particular argument has to be ac-
cepted by every reasonable position (complete labelling) that can be
taken based on the available information (argumentation framework).
The rules of the structured discussion are such that the ability to win
the discussion against a maximally sceptical opponent coincides with
the argument in question being labelled in by each and every com-
plete labelling of the argumentation framework. The structured dis-
cussion proposed in [4] is based on Mackenzie-style persuasion dia-
logue [9, 10], where one can apply moves like claim, why, because
and concede as described above.
The associated implementation [5] uses a command-line interface,
and is written in Python. The argumentation framework can either be
loaded from a text file or entered manually. At the highest level, the
user has eight commands at his disposal: question, claim, load,
save, af cat, af define, and quit. With question the user asks
the system about the status of a particular argument (say A). The
system then responds either with claim in(A), meaning that A has
to be labelled in by every complete labelling, with claim out(A),
meaning thatA has to be labelled out by every complete labelling or
with no commitment A, meaning that neither is the case. In the first
two cases, the associated claim move is the start of a persuasion di-
alogue as described in [4], which the user could choose to bypass by
immediately conceding the main claim. When the user does a claim
command, the system responds either by conceding (if it holds the
claim that a particular argument has to be labelled in or out to be
correct) or by holding a persuasion dialogue (if the system holds the
claim to be incorrect). Although in the latter case, the discussion will
in the end always be won by the system (since the ability to win
the persuasion dialogue for a particular argument coincides with the
argument being labelled in by every complete labelling of the ar-
gumentation framework [4]) the discussion might still lead the user
to valuable insight about why his initial position was wrong. With
the load, save, af cat and af define commands one respectively
loads, saves, displays or manually defines an argumentation frame-
work. The dialogue game follows the rules described in [4], with the
exception that parties can terminate the dialogue at any point by con-
ceding or withdrawing the main claim.
The source code (GPL) and other necessary files can be down-
loaded at the project page 8. The plan is to keep developing it and in-
tegrate it with ArguLab [12]. Furthermore, we are currently working
on a theory in which arguments are more than just abstract entities,
but have an internal structure consisting of a number of reasons that
collectively support a particular claim (conclusion). This would re-
sult in a richer formalism, and the resulting discussion could be more
natural than is the case when (like in the above example) arguments
are completely abstract.
4 CONCLUSION
In general, the ability to express formal inference as the ability to win
a particular type of structured discussion can be helpful for providing
explanation to end users about why the system derived a particular
outcome. If the user disagrees with the system, then one would es-
sentially do the same as when disagreeing with a colleague: start a
discussion.
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